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Among the important tasks for a theory of ampliative inference are the clas-
sification of the kinds of “material postulates”1 that are needed for specific
inferences and the explanation of how those assumptions function in such
inferences. The present paper undertakes an analysis of Deborah Mayo’s
error-statistical (ES) account of scientific evidence in order to clarify just
these points as well as to explain and illustrate the importance of the philo-
sophically neglected notion of the security of an inference [21]. After finding
that, on the most straightforward reading of the ES account, it does not
1The term is John Norton’s [18]. Norton proposes that material postulates and not
formal inductive schemas underwrite inductive inference. The perspective of the present
paper is that while Norton rightly emphasizes the importance of material postulates in
underwriting specific inductive inferences and explaining the growing power of inductive
reasoning, the material postulates do not themselves tell us how they should be used. See
also [25].
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succeed in its own stated aims, two remedies are considered. The first rem-
edy introduces a relativization of evidence claims. The second introduces
stronger assumptions. These two approaches may agree in the kinds of fac-
tual propositions they introduce, but they differ in how those propositions
function in the inference. The choice between these approaches turns on
the relative value attached to two aims of inquiry that are in substantial
tension: the ability to draw strong, informative conclusions and the ability
to reason securely.
In section two I situate the present discussion in the context of concepts
of evidence and inference. Section three introduces the error-statistical ac-
count and the problem I will investigate. I introduce the notion of secure
inference in section four, followed in section five by two proposals for solv-
ing the problem facing error-statistics. Section six introduces an example in
contemporary physics, and discusses the application of these to approaches
to that example. I draw some conclusions in section seven.
2 Error-statistical evidence/inference
I employ Mayo’s error-statistical apparatus [14] for two related purposes:
as a theory of evidence and as a theory of inference. I begin by clarifying
these two notions, their relations to one another and their relations to other
possible uses of the apparatus.
I follow Achinstein [2] in attributing the following significance the con-
cept of evidence as here employed:2 that some body of data or facts E is
2Achinstein [2] delineates several evidence concepts. Evidence in the sense here em-
ployed comes closes to the concept he denotes “potential evidence.” For a discussion of
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evidence for some hypothesis H entails that E constitutes a good reason to
believe that H.
The evidence concept is, on this approach, rather strong [1]. It also
turns out to be closely connected with inference: when E is evidence for a
hypothesis, it also becomes the basis for an inference: ‘E, therefore H’.
Certainly other aims besides true belief are at work in the scientific
assessment of hypotheses. We can regard the question of what should be
inferred from our data as a special case of the more general problem of
“model (or hypothesis) selection.” When deciding which model to select
on the basis of given data, however, it matters what the purpose of the
selection is: to predict future data in a given application, to develop a
hypothesis regarding some distinct phenomenon, to optimize a strategy for
solving some related problem, etc. The focus on evidence and inference
confines us to those cases in which a model or hypothesis is selected for
purposes of believing it to be true. (So as not to beg questions with regard
to scientific realism, those hypotheses can be of the kind: ‘proposition H is
empirically adequate.’)
One consequence of the present approach should be noted at the outset.
If we focus on this strong concept of evidence as involving reasons for belief,
then conditions ensuring merely that a particular hypothesis fares better
than some specific alternatives in light of given data will in general be in-
sufficient for evidence. In particular inclusive concepts of support will not
the compatibility of Achinstein’s understanding of potential evidence with Mayo’s error-
statistics, see [22]. In that discussion, I part ways with Achinstein regarding the concept
of ‘a good reason to believe.’
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be strong enough to capture this notion of evidence.
An inclusive concept of support is one such that the conditions for the
truth of ‘E supports H’ can be met even when there exists an incompatible
competing hypothesis H ′ such that those conditions are at least as well met
by ‘E supports H ′’.
Inclusive concepts of support can be suitable for many purposes. Inclu-
siveness, for example, is a feature of approaches to hypothesis assessment
that focus on making comparative judgments.3 We might wish to consider a
family of hypotheses and pick one that is sufficiently predictively accurate.
Suppose our procedure is such as to pick out the member of that model
M (here ‘model’ indicates a family of hypotheses with the same structure,
but differentiated by parameter values) that has the highest estimated pre-
dictive accuracy (under suitable circumstances, such a procedure can be
provided by use of the Akaike Information Criterion, for example). Data E
can support the selection of hypothesis H for such a purpose although an-
other hypothesis that is not part of M might have an even higher estimated
predictive accuracy [10].
If our concern is true belief, however, inclusive concepts of support will
be too weak, since the conditions for such a concept can be met by one
hypothesis at the same time as another incompatible alternative. If E is a
good reason for me to believe H then it cannot also be a good reason for me
to believe ¬H. The unsuitability of inclusivist accounts for present purposes
will have important implications for the interpretation of the error-statistical
3Mayo has argued against comparativism independently [15] [16]. The present argu-
ment identifies the weakness of comparative approaches in their inclusivity.
4
theory, to which I now turn.
3 What do you mean, “H is false”?
The error statistical theory of evidence can be articulated in terms of the
‘severe test’ requirement as follows: Supposing that hypothesis H is sub-
jected to test procedure T , resulting in data E, E constitutes evidence for
H (H can reasonably be inferred from E) just in case:
SR1 E fits H,
SR2 the probability of H passing T with an outcome such as E (i.e., one
that fits H as well as E does), given that H is false, is very low ([14],
esp. 178–87).
Let us call an evidence claim that is warranted by the satisfaction of
these two conditions a claim about “SR evidence.” For our purposes we can
assume that fit is measured probabilistically, for example in terms of the
likelihood of H on E. The crucial question concerns the second criterion
(“severity”) and how it is to be understood.
To see the nature of the problem, consider an artificially simple example.
A clinical trial is performed to determine the risk that nausea (N) will be
among the outcomes of a proposed treatment (C) for asthma (A). That is to
say, we wish to use data from the trial in the assessment of the hypothesis H:
Individuals suffering from A subjected to the treatment C have a probability
p0 (±) of exhibiting the outcome N .
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To claim that data E support this hypothesis H (for some specific value
of p), by the standards of the error-statistical theory of evidence, it is ap-
parently required that it be very improbable that the test would yield data
fitting H as well as E fits H supposing H to be false. Can this condition be
met?
The answer to this depends on our interpretation of the condition ’H
is false.’ To clarify the issues I offer two possibilities here, both of which
will turn out to be problematic. The “weak sense” of SR2 takes ‘H is false’
to be a covering term for a family of alternatives to H, {Hp}, such that
each Hp asserts: ‘Individuals suffering from A subjected to the treatment
C have a probability p of exhibiting the outcome N ’, where p < p0 −  or
p > p0 + . The “strong sense” of SR2 treats ‘H is false’ more literally:
some other hypothesis is true that entails ¬H. (Note that on either reading
‘H is false’ is insufficient by itself to determine any probability distribution
for the outcomes of the test.)
The advantage of taking SR2 in the weak sense is that it makes the
severity criterion tractable, so that there is no apparent problem that would
prevent H from passing such a test (supposing the data to cooperate, of
course). However, this interpretation jeopardizes the attempt to employ
SR1 and SR2 in a non-inclusive theory of evidence, however. On the weak
reading, the claim that E is SR evidence for H would seem only to license
the conclusion that E confers greater support on H than on any member
of {Hp}. Clearly, however, there are alternative hypotheses that are not
members of {Hp} (hypotheses that confer different probabilities on different
asthma sufferers under treatment, for example), and the fact that E confers
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greater support on H than any member of {Hp} does not entail that none
of those alternatives will receive equally strong support from E.
On the strong reading, the SR2 requirement would mean that under any
incompatible alternative4 H ′, if H ′ were true, it would be very improbable
that the test would yield a result that fits H as well as E does. Thus
understood, however, SR2 cannot in general be met.
This is easiest to see for the case of maximally likely alternatives con-
structed post-data. Suppose that our data comprise a simple listing of in-
dividuals surveyed by our investigation, where for each individual ai, i =
1, . . . , n, we record whether the treatment was applied or not (Cai or ¬Cai)
and whether the outcome in question was observed or not (Nai or ¬Nai).
With our data in hand, we can construct a maximally likely alternative
hypothesis simply by collecting together all m of the individuals for which
Nai obtains. We then relabel these individuals aj , where j = 2i + 1. For
all of the individuals for which ¬Nai is found, we relabel them as ak, where
k = 2i. We have thus assured that individuals with positive outcomes bear
even indices and those with negative outcomes have odd indices. We can
now formulate the following alternative hypothesis H ′: Individuals suffering
from A that are labeled with odd indices that are subjected to the treatment
C have a probability p = 1 of exhibiting the outcome N . Those with even
numbered indices have a probability p = 0 of exhibiting the outcome N .
4Even on this reading, alternative hypotheses must be truly logically incompatible
(they should not be more general explanatory theories, for example – see [14], pp. 198–
99), and sufficiently definite in content to determine a probability distribution over the
sample space in question.
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H ′ is of course an absurd hypothesis produced by what Mayo calls “gel-
lerization.” Nonetheless, given the trivial possibility of constructing such an
alternative for any hypothesis under consideration, it appears that a strong
reading of SR2 leaves us with the unwelcome conclusion that no hypothesis
can pass a severe test given any data.
Mayo’s response to this kind of example seems to take the threat to
arise from the possible claim that the alternative hypothesis H ′ is just as
well-tested as the H. She insists that in a case in which “the hypothesis
is constructed on the basis of data” both the data and the content of the
hypothesis must be treated as outcomes of the procedure. Thus the severe
test criterion must take this into account and be formulated as
There is a very high probability that the test procedure would
not pass the hypothesis it tests, given that the hypothesis is false.
([14], 202)
Of course the hypothesis H ′ constructed as just described does not meet
this criterion. The procedure employed in formulating and passing such a
hypothesis will pass whatever hypothesis it generates quite independently
of the truth of that hypothesis.
This response does not solve the problem, which is independent of whether
H ′ itself is severely tested. Neither is the problem one of the goodness or
reliability of a testing procedure that generates H ′ as an outcome. The
problem for the error-statistical account is that the mere existence of H ′ as
a possibility prevents us from saying that condition SR2 has been met.5
5This challenge to error-statistics was first articulated, in slightly different form and
context, by John Roberts [20].
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The error-statistician thus faces a dilemma. A weak reading of SR2 will
permit the conditions for an SR evidence claim to be sometimes met, but
the resulting evidence concept will be too weak to escape inclusivism. That
a test outcome constitutes SR evidence for H on such a reading would not
rule an alternative not in {Hp} receiving even stronger support from that
test, were it to be included in the class of hypotheses under consideration.
A strong reading of SR2 will permit the reading of ‘E is SR evidence for
H’ in a non-inclusive sense, but at the unreasonable cost of never being in
a position to make an evidence claim at all.
I would like to consider two options for the error-statistican to escape
this dilemma. The choice between these two options will rest largely on
consideration of the security of inference, and so I turn first to an explanation
of that concept.
4 Secure inference
I propose that we reason securely to the degree that our inferences or eviden-
tial judgments are stable under changes in our background information that
are possible, given what we know (i.e., changes that are epistemically possi-
ble). The idea here concerns what happens as we learn new things. The aim
of secure inference is not that our beliefs about how things are remain the
same, but that we be able to continue to regard our past judgments about
what should be concluded from the then-available data as having been cor-
rect, so that our acquisition of new information allows us to build on our
past judgments rather than requiring us continually to start over.
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Security of inference derives its importance largely from the fact that ev-
idential judgments rest on fallible assumptions, such that the failure of those
assumptions can defeat the judgments in question. For example, Galileo’s
opponents in his arguments for Copernicanism incorrectly held that perpen-
dicular free fall is evidence that the earth is stationary. Newton held that
the fortuitously-placed and nearly circular orbits of the planets is evidence
that they were the result of choice on the part of a providential deity. Many
of Darwin’s critics incorrectly held that domestic breeding provided evidence
against evolution by natural selection [19]. In each of these cases an evidence
claim was predicated on a false empirical assumption, leading to an error
that could only be corrected by discarding or replacing that assumption.
One of the most important applications of security is in understanding
the value of robust evidence, i.e., evidence that rests on multiple independent
tests. As I have explained in detail elsewhere [21], the advantage enjoyed
by robust evidence is that the failure of an assumption that is not shared
by all of the tests on which that result depends does not necessarily defeat
(though it might weaken) the evidence claim itself. This protection against
failure of background assumptions enhances the security of inferences from
robust evidence.
Security of inference is not to be confused with reliability of inference,
where reliability is to be thought of in terms of the rate at which a type
of inference yields true beliefs. If I draw my inferences according to the
standards SR, for example, then in virtue of the resulting low error rate of
my procedure, I am following a reliable inference procedure (at least if we
construe SR2 in the strong sense). I might not be reasoning securely, how-
10
ever. My assessment of the error probabilities of my procedure might rest
on very shaky grounds, such that many plausible scenarios regarding future
relevant information would require that I give up my belief (I never actu-
ally calibrated my instruments, arbitrarily trusting that the factory settings
would be adequate). That could be the case even though as a matter of
fact the error probabilities of my procedure are really as low as I take them
to be (“as chance would have it,” the instruments are calibrated quite well
right out of the box!). Thus, while reliability considerations are externalist
in character, security incorporates a more internalist perspective, requiring
the consideration of what future developments might take place given what
the inquirer knows.
As important as security is, the more secure inference is not always the
best kind of inference to draw. This will be important to keep in mind as
we return to the error statistician’s dilemma.
5 Relativization or implausibility judgment?
John Roberts, who first argued for the alternative hypothesis difficulty dis-
cussed above in the context of assessing “high-level” theories by severe test-
ing, has proposed what he regards as a friendly amendment to the error
statistical account. Roberts proposes that judgments about high-level the-
ories in light of piecemeal severe testing be relativized to those assumptions
that are not themselves severely tested, and are sufficiently strong to rule out
competing hypotheses that threaten to nullify severity assessments for such
tests. Such assumptions must meet certain constraints, however. Roberts
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proposes that we endorse the results of severe testing as it relates to high-
level theories only when those test outcomes are relativized to assumptions
that have been made explicit, that make possible the measurement of param-
eters that potentially describe nature, and that can be (albeit non-severely)
tested (and hence possibly refuted) by means of multiple independent mea-
surements of those same parameters.
Such an approach certainly could be adapted to the context of such low-
level empirical claims as that in our toy example above. If one assumes
that there is some definite and uniform probability that a randomly selected
asthma sufferer will experience nausea subsequent to receiving treatment C,
then the rate at which members of an appropriately gathered sample of C-
treated asthma sufferers experiences nausea can be taken as a measurement
of that probability. Furthermore, although that assumption may not itself
be susceptible to severe testing, it can be tested in a weaker sense. If, for
example, upon repeated sampling, we find that our estimate of the proba-
bility does not appear to be converging on any number, this might indicate
that our working assumption is incorrect. Most importantly, of course, this
assumption effectively cuts off our need to consider such exotic alternatives
as H ′.
Here I propose an alternative (also discussed in [24]) that does not rely
on relativization. I will compare the the two approaches in section six.
What is needed is a way to reduce the class of hypotheses to be considered
as alternatives without relativizing our evidential judgments. We certainly
could begin to incorporate hypotheses such as H ′ into our testing models.
Our testing procedures could remain useful for learning, so long as we did
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not use the data to construct these alternatives. But of course we know
that if we brought in a hypothesis similar to H ′ as an alternative without
using such a construction procedure, it would almost certainly fail any test
to which we subjected it. There is no need to be worried about the mere
existence of alternative hypotheses which are such that, were they to be
subjected to any genuinely informative test, would be almost certain to fail.
The notion of an “informative” test here is meant to refer to something
analogous to, but weaker than, a severe test. To say that a hypothesis
H passes an informative test with a given result E means that, supposing
some alternative hypothesis H ′ to be true, it would be highly improbable
that H would pass the test with a result that fits as well as E. In effect,
by eliminating from consideration hypotheses that we expect to fail any
informative test we are eliminating only those that we antecedently judge
would only pass tests that were “rigged” in advance to favor those hypotheses
(like our gellerized example H ′).
In short, my proposal (IJ for “implausibility judgment”) is that we ex-
clude from our class of relevant hypotheses those which we antecedently
judge to be nearly certain to fail any informative test to which they are sub-
jected. We can then take the ‘H is false’ locution in SR2 as a covering term
for all of the incompatible alternatives to H exclusive of those antecedently
judged to be (in this sense) too implausible to consider. There does not seem
to be any general basis for skepticism regarding the possibility of satisfying
SR2 conceived in this way.
Two points regarding the IJ approach to alternative hypothesis objec-
tions are worth emphasizing.
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First, evidential relations remain objective on the present account in the
sense that they obtain or fail to obtain independently of our beliefs about
them. The role played here by plausibility judgments is not like the role
of prior probabilities in Bayesian accounts. An investigator’s judgment that
H ′ is not a plausible alternative hypothesis in the sense that it would almost
certainly not pass any informative testing procedure is a fallible background
assumption in the judgment that H has passed a severe test. This assump-
tion, and hence the severity assessment made based on it, may be mistaken.
This feature distinguishes such judgments from prior probability assessments
in personalist Bayesian approaches.
Second, these judgments are empirical, making their status different from
that of prior probability judgments in logical probability approaches. Al-
though just how such empirical judgments are made needs to be worked out
in more detail than I will here undertake, let me just sketch how such an
account might go.
Our determination that a hypothesis regarding a particular phenomenon
is not a legitimate alternative is based largely on our knowledge of the kinds
of patterns of behavior found in other natural phenomena. Such reasoning
may be largely analogical in character. In our example, we exclude H ′ from
consideration because it in effect postulates a kind of “conspiracy of nature”
in which the outcome of treatment in a given case correlates with the at-
tachment of a certain index to the data in an arbitrary labeling scheme. Our
previous experience of data collection across a broad range of phenomena
provides us with ample reason to believe that nature is indifferent to our
schemes for data-labelling. Although this very general proposition does not
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seem susceptible to severe testing (what are the probability distributions
determined by its denial?), to the extent the present case resembles other
cases in which data-labelling has failed to correlate with the phenomenon
under study, we can expect an analogous indifference to obtain.
What both the relativization proposal and IJ share is that they require,
prior to the drawing of inferences from the results of severe testing, an ad-
ditional step that cannot in general be made on the basis of severe testing.
The conclusions that the two approaches permit one to draw, however, are
quite different in character, as can be seen most clearly by considering the
consequences of the relevant assumptions being overturned by subsequent
findings. To explain and to emphasize the potential import of these consid-
erations, let me introduce a less artificial application: the use of parametric
frameworks for testing some fundamental principles of physics.
6 Theories of Gravity
6.1 The PPN formalism
Our first example of such an enterprise comes from the experimental in-
vestigation of theories of gravity through the Parametrized Post-Newtonian
(PPN) framework, an example discussed already by both Mayo and Roberts
[15] [16] [20].
The PPN formalism was developed to enable the comparison of metric
theories of gravity with each other and with the outcomes of experiment, at
least insofar as those theories are considered in the slow-motion, weak-field
limit. Metric theories of gravity can be characterized by three postulates:
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1. spacetime is endowed with a metric g,
2. the world lines of test bodies are geodesics of that metric, and
3. in local freely falling frames (Lorentz frames) the nongravitational laws
of physics are those of special relativity. ([26], 22)
The ability to compare such theories is facilitated by using a common frame-
work for writing out the metric g as an expansion, such that different the-
ories are manifested by their differing values for the constants used in the
expansion. As Clifford Will writes, “The only way that one metric theory
differs from another is in the numerical values of the coefficients that appear
in front of the metric potentials. The [PPN] formalism inserts parameters
in place of these coefficients, parameters whose values depend on the theory
under study” ([27], 29).
Crucial to the issues at hand is the fact that the PPN framework only
encompasses metric theories of gravity. Such theories, which treat grav-
ity as a manifestation of curved spacetime, satisfy the Einstein Equivalence
Principle (EEP). EEP is equivalent to the conjunction of three apparently
distinct principles — Local Position Invariance (LPI ), Local Lorentz Invari-
ance (LLI ) and the Weak Equivalence Principle (WEP).
WEP holds that “if an uncharged test body is placed at an initial event
in spacetime and given an initial velocity there, then its subsequent trajec-
tory will be independent of its internal structure and composition” ([26],
22)6. According to LLI, the outcome of any ”local nongravitational test
6The test body in question must have negligible self-gravitational energy, according to
Newtonian gravitational theory, and negligible coupling to inhomogeneities in any external
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experiment” is independent of the velocity of the experimental apparatus,
and LPI states that the outcome of any such experiment is independent of
its spacetime location. Here a “local nongravitational test experiment” is
understood to be an experiment in a freely falling laboratory shielded and
small enough to render inhomogeneties in external fields negligible through-
out its volume and in which self-gravitational effects are negligible ([26],
22).
Mayo’s account emphasizes the positive role played by the PPN frame-
work in facilitating, not only the comparison of existing theories, but also the
construction of new alternatives (“straw men” in Will’s phrase) as a means
of probing the various ways in which General Relativity (GR) could be in er-
ror. In addition, she argues that the resulting proliferation of alternatives to
GR was not a manifestation of a theory in “crisis,” but rather of an exciting
new ability to probe gravitational phenomena and prevent the premature
acceptance of GR. She claims various advantages for her account over the
approaches of Bayesians and “comparativists.” A key to these advantages,
it seems, is the way in which the PPN formalism allows for the combination
of the results of piecemeal hypothesis tests, not only to show that some pos-
sibilities have been eliminated, but to indicate in a positive sense the extent
to which gravitation is a phenomenon that GR (or theories similar to GR)
gets, in some respects, right: “By getting increasingly accurate estimates,
more severe constraints are placed on how far theories can differ from [GR],
in the respects probed” [16]. Note here how the results of this investigation
are taken to give us more than merely comparative conclusions. Mayo is
fields
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committed to being able to say more, on the basis of the outcomes of such
tests, than that certain possible theories have been refuted.7
As John Roberts argues [20], Mayo’s approach does not quite work in
the way that she would like. While the “squeezing” of “theory-space” can
be brought about by combined piecemeal tests as Mayo claims, the space
that is squeezed is not the space of all possible theories of gravity, or even
of all theories of gravity that have been actually formulated. It is only the
space of all metric theories of gravity, i.e., those satisfying EEP. Nonmetric
theories are certainly possible, and some have been proposed (though none
so far that are compatible with empirical results).8 Non-metric theories as a
class could be ruled out on error-statistical grounds, according to Roberts,
only if we could carry out a severe test of the Einstein Equivalence Principle
(EEP). Such a test would require at a minimum a severe test of WEP.9
However, this is not possible. WEP quantifies over all spacetime and all
bodies of a certain kind. The principle could be violated either in regions
of spacetime remote from ours or by kinds of matter that have not yet
been tested. For precisely this reason, the very high precision with which
some of the PPN parameters have been measured is not, without further
7Another noteworthy discussion of the PPN framework is due to William Harper, who
assimilates it to an extension of the methodology developed by Newon in the Principia,
in which the standard of empirical success incorporates the accurate, theory-mediated
measurement of parameters of the theory by predicted data, and in which theoretical
propositions are accepted as a guide to future research [8] [9].
8One such theory, discussed by Lightman and Lee [12] as well as Will [26] is the
Belinfante-Swihart theory [4] [5] [6].
9If Schiff’s conjecture that EEP is equivalent to WEP is true, then it would also require
no more than severely testing WEP.
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assumptions, equivalent to the high severity (in the strong sense of SR2 )
with which corresponding hypotheses about the values of those parameters
have been tested.
6.2 Applying the two approaches
Both relativization and IJ seek to close the gap between theory and exper-
iment so that the results of severe tests can be made relevant to the theory
under consideration. But the two approaches give quite different answers to
the question of what is learned from such testing.
The relativization approach endorses the EEP assumption on the grounds
that doing so allows for the measurement by multiple, independent means of
parameters that only have a meaning within metric theories of gravity, and
that it is susceptible to being, though it has not been, shown to be in error.
What we then conclude from the results of testing is that relative to this
assumption, numerous sources of experimental data provide evidence that
the values of those parameters that characterize gravitational phenomena
differ very little, if at all, from the values assigned by GR (call the latter
claim GRP ).
If on the other hand the IJ approach is followed, then these same results
become evidence for GRP not merely relative to EEP, but in fact, unless our
assumption that EEP holds to the needed degree of accuracy turns out to be
incorrect. That is not a trivial worry, either. In effect, on the IJ proposal,
one would take the all of the previous tests of EEP on various physical
systems in various locations as a basis for holding it to be implausible that
types of physical systems not yet tested and physical systems in locations not
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yet tested would behave differently with regard to EEP. This is, of course, a
substantive empirical assumption. It cannot be severely tested, but insofar
as it is reasonable to regard untested systems and locations as analogous to
those that have been tested, it will be a reasonable assumption. (Physicists
are presently engaged in programs of testing EEP that employ parametric
frameworks similar to PPN. See the appendix for a brief discussion.)
The advantage of the relativization approach is clear: our judgments of
relativized evidence enjoy a degree of security not shared by the kind of un-
relativized claim emerging from IJ. Even if EEP turns out to be false, it can
(and will, assuming we analyzed the data correctly and understand correctly
the relevant characteristics of our testing procedures) remain nonetheless
true that relative to EEP, the data constitute evidence for GRP . In the IJ
approach, learning that EEP is false amounts to having to give up our claim
that the data constitute evidence for GRP .
Security, however, is not the only value to consider here. The motivation
for developing a non-inclusive account of scientific evidence was to allow us
to develop a strong concept of evidence that would be suitable for serving
as the basis of scientific inference. That is, we wanted to be able to assert
that when E is evidence for H, then one can reasonably infer from E to the
truth of H. We can therefore ask whether relativized SR evidence claims
meet this criterion.
If we apply our definition of inclusivism above to relativized SR evidence
claims, we discover an ambiguity in our definition. On the one hand it is true
that if conditions SR are met by result E of test T , relative to assumptionsB,
then it will not be the case that E will support an incompatible hypothesis
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H ′ relative to B. On the other hand, E might well support an incompatible
alternative H ′ relative another set of assumptions B′.
As a consequence, given that E is SR evidence for H relative to B, it
will be reasonable to infer from E to H only insofar as it is reasonable to
believe B to be true. But notice that on the relativization account at hand,
the basis for relativizing to B is not directly connected to it being reasonable
to think that B is true, but rather is connected to the usefulness of B in
permitting the measurement of parameters, to the testability of B, and to
B’s not having been falsified. Thus it can be reasonable on the relativization
proposal to employ assumptions that underwrite an evidence claim, without
that evidence claim supporting a reasonable inference.
The IJ proposal imposes on the assumptions behind our evidential judg-
ments a restriction directly related to truth. The price to be paid is that
our evidential judgments are subject to a kind of defeat that is avoided by
the relativization approach. Because future developments that are perfectly
compatible with what we presently know could defeat, for example, our as-
sumption that EEP holds to the necessary degree of accuracy, our inferences
based on that assumption are rendered to a degree insecure.
Such an outcome should not be shocking, however. Compare the kind
of insecurity that holds for the evidential status of GR, for example, with
that involved in the low level hypothesis assessment discussed in our orig-
inal example. The working assumption in the low level case amounted to
little more than the assumption that nature does not conspire against us.
Although it is possible that nature could somehow conspire against us, it is
reasonable to assume that this is not the case. But claims about the na-
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ture of gravity are bound to be attended by greater epistemic risk, and on
the current proposal that risk enters through the stronger assumptions that
must be made to enable evidential judgments to be drawn.
7 Conclusion
Any given error-statistical inference will rely on a material postulate con-
cerning the error-rates, or severity, of the testing procedure behind that
inference. If, however, the error-statistical approach is to provide a concept
of support that, by escaping inclusivism, provides a good basis for a theory
of scientific inference, then an additional material postulate will be needed.
This second postulate will need to provide the basis for taking the severity
postulate in a strong sense.
Here I have considered two different ways in which this second postulate
might enter our reasoning: either as a basis for relativized evidence claims or
as a claim to the effect that certain possibilities do not deserve consideration.
Both approaches bring their own problems. The choice ultimately must be
referred to the aims of inquiry. If we suppose that the ability to make mea-
surements and be explicit in the assumptions underlying such measurements
constitute sufficient aims for scientific inquiry, then relativization constitutes
a more secure way to pursue those aims. On the other hand, if we suppose
that scientific inquiry is aimed at discovering what it is reasonable for us to
believe, then relativized evidence claims seem insufficiently strong, and we
will have to accept the epistemically risky nature of the scientific enterprise.
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8 Appendix: From PPN to THµ
There is another formalism that has been developed to systematize the
search for violations of EEP that functions analogously to the PPN frame-
work for tests of GR. This formalism, dubbed THµ, was first developed by
Lightman and Lee [12] for purposes of proving Schiff’s conjecture for a re-
stricted class of theories. The class of theories that can be described within
the THµ formalism includes all metric theories. It also includes many, but
not all, non-metric theories.10 The ability to put non-metric theories into
a common framework such that limitations can be put on EEP violations
in a systematic way provides a powerful extension of the program of testing
within PPN. However, just as PPN is limited by its exclusion of non-metric
theories, THµ is limited by including only some non-metric theories. It is
precisely for this reason that Schiff’s conjecture is still called a conjecture.11
10The restriction, more specifically, is to theories that describe the center-of-mass accel-
eration of an electromagnetic test body (effects from weak and strong forces are neglected)
in a static, spherically symmetric (SSS) gravitational field, such that the dynamics for
particle motion is derivable from a Lagrangian. The parameters T and H appear in the
Lagrangian;  and µ appear in the “gravitationally modified Maxwell equations” (GMM).
Lightman and Lee argue (in 1973) that “all theories we know of” have GMM equations of
the type needed, and that all but one theory (which they treat separately) can be repre-
sented in terms of the appropriate Lagrangian, although this may require (as in the case
of Belinfante-Swihart theory) a “reformulation” of the theory [12].
11It is noteworthy that Lightman and Lee, in introducing the formalism, express skepti-
cism about the possibility of an unrestricted proof of Schiff’s conjecture precisely because
doing so would require a “moderately deep understanding” of all theories of gravity sat-
isfying WEP, “including theories not yet invented” (ibid., 364). Such epistemic modesty
with regard to “all possible” claims is central to the error-statistical emphasis on “learning
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THµ focuses on the behavior of charged particles in an external static
spherically symmetric gravitational field with potential U . The motion of
charged particles in this external field is described by two arbitrary functions
T (U) and H(U), while (U) and µ(U) describe the response of the electro-
magnetic fields to U . The following identity is satisifed by every metric
theory:
 = µ = (H/T )1/2 (1)
for any U .
This formalism has proven to be adaptable to the pursuit of tests of null
hypotheses for each of the components of EEP. By taking various combina-
tions of the four THµ parameters, one can define three “non-metric param-
eters,” Γ0, Λ0, and Υ0, such that if EEP is satisfied then Γ0 = Λ0 = Υ0 = 0
everywhere.
Tests of the components of EEP can then be investigated in terms of null
tests for these parameters. A non-zero value for Υ0 is a sign, for example,
of a failure of LLI. Will describes how the results of the Hughes-Drever
experiment (“the most precise null experiment ever performed” [26], 31)
can be analyzed so as to yield an upper bound of Υ0 < 10−13 and concludes
that “to within at least a part in 1013, Local Lorentz Invariance is valid”
(ibid., 62).
The point made previously about the PPN formalism applies here as
well. To regard such tests as showing (by means of severe testing) that LLI
must be valid to within the cited accuracy, we must rely on some plausibility
assumptions.
about” rather than conclusively establishing general and fundamental theories in physics.
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We should first note that, just as for the case of low-level hypotheses,
one can trivially construct “conspiracies of nature” that will predict such
experimental outcomes in a way that is compatible with the failure of the
principle being tested. In particular, one could explicitly introduce terms
into the Lagrangian that yield two arbitrarily large violations of LLI that
are equal (or very nearly so) but opposite in sign. There is even precedent
in physics for such theories, in the sense that theory has sometimes required
such “fine-tuned” balancing of two oppositely signed contributions to yield
a very small quantity [17] [23]. In any case, at least the same kind of “no-
conspiracy” assumptions that are called for in low-level hypothesis testing
will be needed here.
More substantively, recall that the THµ formalism, like the PPN for-
malism, can only be applied to a restricted class of theories (although this
class is less restricted than that of PPN). Thus the analysis that allows for
the limit in question to be generated does require that we assume that the
correct theory of phenomena in the weak-field, slow-motion limit is among
those theories. This assumption is weaker than the assumption of EEP (or
of LLI ), which is needed for the application of the PPN formalism. Nonethe-
less, just as with EEP, It is very unclear just how such an assumption could
itself be subjected to a severe test. On the present account, this assumption
need not pass a severe test in order to be reasonable.
Returning to the example of Lorentz invariance (LLI ), the Hughes-
Drever experiment cited above is an example of a “clock comparison” ex-
periment. In the version performed by Drever at Glasgow University [7], the
“clock” was constituted by the transition frequencies of the J = 3/2 ground
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state of the 7Li nucleus in an external magnetic field. The magnetic field
introduces a splitting of the ground state into four levels. Any perturba-
tion introduced by a preferred direction in space would result in a further
splitting, resulting in an inequality of the spacing between the lines. Similar
experiments have been performed on numerous systems subsequently; none
have uncovered any signs of Lorentz violation. Clock comparison tests are
just one of a growing variety of tests of LLI, each of which is specific to a
particular type of matter-energy. Mattingly gives a helpful review of a vast
number of such tests in [13].12
In concluding his review, Mattingly notes that “over the last decade or
two a tremendous amount of progress has been made in tests of Lorentz
invariance. Currently, we have no experimental evidence that Lorentz sym-
metry is not an exact symmetry in nature,” and asks, “When have we tested
enough?” Without quite answering that question, he notes the difficulty of
fitting any Lorentz-violating terms into existing field theories consistently
with experiment and concludes that “It therefore seems hard to believe that
Lorentz invariance could be violated in a simple way.” [13]
Where does this leave us with respect to the status of PPN tests of grav-
ity? Considering only LLI and neglecting the other components of EEP
(and acknowledging that an actual argument for my claim would require
12Mattingly discusses these results and others in the context of yet another (!) formal-
ism, the Standard Model Extension (SME) [11] , that is even broader than THµ and
that is useful for, among other things, systematizing the testing of LLI. Bailey and Kost-
elecky´ [3] discuss how the SME can be applied to the gravitational sector, noting that the
phenomena that can be described in the PPN and the SME are overlapping, but distinct.
Each has its blind spots.
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a much more detailed discussion of the existing experimental situation), it
seems that, although there are possible ways that LLI (and hence EEP)
could fail, these plausibly fall into the following three categories: (1) con-
spiracies of nature, (2) violations involving forms of matter not yet tested,
and (3) phenomena outside the scope for which the PPN approach claims
validity.
It is the second category that is the most troubling for the error-statistical
approach, and which distinguishes the alternative-hypothesis worries for low-
level from those for high-level hypotheses on that account. In both contexts,
I have argued, error-statistical assessment gets under way only after we as-
sume that nature does not conspire against us. But the kind of universality
involved in a principle such as LLI demands a stronger assumption before
we can hope to invoke severe tests on behalf of the principle. Nonetheless,
I believe that such assumptions can not only be made, but can be justified,
even if doing so does involve some risk. So, for example, clock compari-
son tests have only been made using first-generation matter (up and down
quarks and electrons). No such test (to my knowledge) has been carried
out using second- or third-generation matter (such as muon or tau leptons,
charm, strange, bottom, or top quarks). However, there are good plausibil-
ity arguments for expecting such tests, were they to be carried out, to fall
in line with the results on first-generation matter, since the known physics
for all three generations is essentially the same. Still (and here is where the
risk lies), no one knows why more than one generation of matter exists, and
if we did understand the answer to that question, it is at least possible that
we would have a reason to think that there would be a difference in their
27
adherence to Lorentz invariance.
Finally, the third category is by far the more interesting as far as physics
is concerned, but is no embarrassment from the standpoint of the error-
statistical account of theory assessment defended here. Indeed, much of
the testing of LLI, and of EEP more generally is directed not so much at
establishing greater support for those principles, but in the active search for
the manner in which they might fail, as such failures, should they be found,
are among our current best hopes for developing the fundamental physics
that we do not yet possess.
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